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ABSTRACT
Global information and communications technologies create criminal opportunities in which criminal
violation and physical proximity are decoupled. As in all our endeavors, the good become the prey
of the bad. Murderous and venal exploitation of ICT has followed from the inception of the Internet ,
threatening all the good it brings and the trust we need so badly as a people. As the work continues
to expand the implementation of Smart Cities and the Internet of Things, there will be more
opportunities for exploitation of these technologies. We examine the social and liberty risks our data
and technology-driven responses may entail.
Keywords: Big data, analytics, privacy, information polity

1. INTRODUCTION
The
growth
and
distribution
of
internetworked, instrumented objects feeding
into an intelligent framework for analysis
offer tremendous benefits. These include
smart traffic management , smart logistic
scheduling, smart policing, smart corrections
and all the myriad of services that can benefit
from structured, algorithmic analysis and
implementation. The growth in analytic
power and inference depends on data
generated in Smart Cities and the objects of
the Internet of Things. With all these benefits
we must consider the increased risks of
criminal conduct towards personal security
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and of state overreaching that may shift the
balance between state and citizen.
This
is
particularly
true
where
components of this implement geographic
information system analysis. In the game of
who-when-where-what-how, the foundation
of all investigation and reporting, GIS data
can connect the where and when to who and
what , either directly or inferentially. The
richness of this spatio-temporal data
modelling and statistical inference challenges
social and legal bounds, especially of
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we must consider these for the future as these
technologies--- analytics, data generation and
data collection ---grow in power.

privacy and
personal security.

We must consider the systems as a SocioTechnical System for Governance and
address evolving standards of conduct. And

Historical

Now

FUTURE!

Figure 1. Temporal Considerations for Effective Policy
Development

2. LEGAL REGilVIE OF
INFORMATION
One key area are the protections associated
with values of privacy and personal
autonomy. Both civil and common law have
for centuries protected these from intrusion,
with doctrines relating to trespass and
trespass to chattels up to sui generis video
voyeurism statutes. This reflects direct
invasion of those interests as well as the use
of the invasion for other injuries. For
example, the United States Congress enacted
legislation to prohibit states from selling the
information of individuals receiving motor
vehicle licenses; although quite profitable for
the states, this information was used to stalk,
assault and murder the citizens of those
states.
These have been issues of policy and law
throughout the evolution of informational
technologies. For GIS, Onsrud, Johnson and
Lopez (1994) observed that personal privacy
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is a social issue of increasing relevance to the
geographic information system community
where specific privacy protection practices
are needed.
Within the GIS community, Cho (2005)
discussed overall legal issues within the data
sphere of spatiotemporal information. This
examined general law and policy, data
sharing concerns, privacy interests and
liability for injuries to life, liberty, and
property from the application of these
technologies. This addressed the impact of
jurisdiction
(domestic,
international,
transnational),
property
interests/ intellectual property and contract
law within these regimes.
As with issues of governance generally,
and with the interaction of new technologies
with social life in particular, we begin to see
an important and interconnected relationship
between research within disciplines of
knowledge analysis, the practical use of those
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systems and the legal/ ethical implications of
that use.

Law
Enforcement
Practice

I \
Domain

Law, Policy,
Ethics

Research

Figure 2 Interrelationship of Research, Practice and Law / Ethics in Polity
Governance

These reflect
the importance of
considering consequences, both historical and
potential, the allocation of responsibility for
those consequences and the role of
governance in balancing the competing
interests at issue. They are all interrelated:

ethics and outcomes drive policy, which
drives political responses which drive legal
results which, if not perfect (and they never
are) lead to new policies.

~-------------~
politics

•

;

policy

I

\

ethics

politics

law
Figure 3 Process of governance in an
information polity
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2 .1 Analysis and hn.plica.tions
under the Laws of the United
States
Under American law, no citizen may be
deprived of life liberty or property without the
due process of law, a constitutional guarantee of
fundamental fairness. Issues of due process were
discussed in the United States Supreme Court
cases of Goldberg v. Kelly and Mathews v
Eldridge. The basic analysis that must take
place is a trifold weighing of factors:
what is the nature and extent of the
injury to the individual by the state
action,
2. what is the risk of a wrongful outcome
through the use of state action, and
3. what is the nature and extent of the
interest of the State in the matter at
hand.
1.

The common law's flexibility is essential, for
"time works changes, brings into existence new
conditions and purposes" Olmstead v. United
States , (1928) (Justice Brandeis, dissenting).
Justice Brandeis wrote a dissent which set the
foundation for the subsequent evolution of the
law to protect the rights of privacy; his prescient
analysis is even more relevant for today:
Subtler and more far-reaching means
of invading privacy have become
available to the Government. Discovery
and invention have made it possible for
the Government, by means far more
effective than stretching upon the rack,
to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet.
Moreover, "in the application of a
constitution, our contemplation cannot
be only of what has, been but of what
may be." The progress of science in
furnishing the Government with means
of espionage is not likely to stop with
wiretapping. Ways may someday be
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developed by which the Government ,
without removing papers from secret
drawers, can reproduce them in court,
and by which it will be enabled to expose
to a jury the most intimate occurrences
of the home. Advances in the psychic
and related sciences may bring means of
exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts
and emotions. "That places the liberty
of every man in the hands of every petty
officer" was said by James Otis of much
lesser intrusions than these._...
It is not the breaking of his doors,
and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offence;
but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property, where that
right has never been forfeited by his
conviction of some public offence -- it is
the invasion of this sacred right which
underlies and constitutes the essence of
Lord Camden's judgment. Breaking into
a house and opening boxes and drawers
are circumstances of aggravation; but
any forcible and compulsory extortion of
a man's own testimony or of his private
papers to be used as evidence of a crime
or to forfeit his goods is within the
condemnation of that judgment. In this
the
Fourth
and
Fifth
regard,
Amendments run almost into each
other.
Ultimately, the reasoning of Justice
Brandeis prevailed and the Supreme Court
overruled Olmstead, holding that the police
interception of telephone calls was a violation of
fundamental constitutional protections and an
unreasonable search. In that case, Katz v.
United States, (1967) the Supreme Court
further detailed the fundamental test for
judging the limits of government power: that a
government search is unreasonable in violation
of the fourth amendment when it violates a he
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reasonable expectation of privacy, thereby
moving this doctrine untethered from physical
traditions.
This analysis was repeated in a number of
21 st-century cases that define privacy interests
against intrusion with the evolution of new
technologies and new systems. Those cases
include United States v. Jones (2012), North
Carolina v. Grady (2015), where satellite
monitoring was found to constitute a search
under the Fourth Amendment and Riley v.
California (2015). In Riley, cell phone searches
incident to an arrest were found in proper, a
change from earlier jurisprudence rules which
permitted the search of an individual and their
possessions once they were arrested. Riley v.
California reflected
Justice
Sotomayor's
observations in United States v. Jones that on
GPS profiling power cited in support of the
ultimate determination that under the Fourth
Amendment there were greater limits on cell
phone data searches than for less-data intensive
artifacts.
Although the Supreme Court ruled on
traditional trespass grounds in United States v.
Jones (2012) , the concurring opinions of Justice
Sotomayor, considered a liberal jurist, and
Justice Alito, considered a conservative jurist,
analyzed the greater, future issues at stake in
the growth of these new technologies. Justice
Sotomayor noted that Katz v United States
realigned the controlling test for modern privacy
as protecting a person's reasonable-expectationof-privacy. Her greater concern - a system of
inexpensive GIS for people could "alter the
relationship between citizen and government in
a way that is inimical to democratic society" via
GPS data monitoring, aggregation and analysis:
GPS monitoring generates a precise,
comprehensive record of a person's
public movements that reflects a wealth
of detail about her familial , political,
professional, religious, and sexual
associations. . .. The Government can
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store such records and efficiently mine
them for information years into the
future .... And because GPS monitoring
is cheap in comparison to conventional
surveillance techniques and, by design,
proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the
ordinary checks that constrain abusive
law enforcement practices: "limited
police
resources
and
community
hostility." Illinois v. Lidster
Justice Alito expanded this analysis as to
the instrumented devices contributing data to
the geospatial corpus: CCTV, automated tolling
systems, automobile automatic notifications
systems, cellular telephones and other wireless
devices. Joined by three other justices, he
suggested that while short-term monitoring
would be reasonable, longer-term it would be an
illegal invasion of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment. As with electronic monitoring of
communications, that this was an area open to
Congressional legislation to establish privacy
rights and the punishments for their violation.

2.2

Leg-al Analysis for the Future

There are a variety of factors to consider as to
the way in which a governance structure within
the information polity is rendered. Some of the
individual elements that might be considered
are:

•
•
•
•
•

Data
Analytics & Algorithms
Rendition & Representation
Systems (collection, storage, analysis,
rendition)
Users and Use/ disclosure.

Issues that relate to the individual datum or
collected data can be constructed around their
characteristics, such as mandates, prohibitions
or special permissions on data. This may
connect to systems aspects for the generation
and collection of data. The use of data analytics
and the algorithms which drive such analysis
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has generally not been deeply scrutinized except
where outputs produce clearly discriminatory
results which may conflict with other
regulations.
There has been significant discussion about
the inherent dangers of discriminatory
programming,
whether
intentional
or
unintentional, that may produce inappropriate
output. This may appear in the final rendition
and representation of the data analysis. From
this flows issues of who uses that analysis, how
they use it or how they might disclose it to
others along with any underlying data
associated with it.
A number of privacy regimes, such as those
of the European Union, distilled this down to
three general areas within which regulation is
constructed. These general regulatory areas are
1. data collection,
2. data analytics and analysis, and
3. data use and disclosure.
Governance of the potential damage with
the use of these systems may seek limitations
within these areas and define granular
regulations within them.
This intersects with the police power of the
state using such powerful data systems to
promote public security. These analytics can be
used for various types of state action.
Limitations on state action vary with national
law and, in some cases, the interrelationship
with international treaty law, such as those
enforced by the European Court of Human
Rights. The examination of the implementation
of data analytics into police action must
consider the different requirements for any
particular police action. The continuum of
evidentiary weight that each type of police
action requires is different for:

•
•
•

Investigation
Designation for further contact
Designation as "person of interest"
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Investigative detention
P/ C
Arrest
Search
Indictment / Prosecution
Trial
Conviction

At the same time, there are civil law
restrictions on the infringement of personal
autonomy that may be based on constitutional
provisions, statutes or common-law practices.
Liberty and personal autonomy as the rights of
the citizens of a polity may look at the right to
control access to and distribution of personal
information of various types.
The common-law tort of invasion of privacy
is instructive in this regard under American law.
Where the Second Restatement of Torts set this
out as four distinct areas, it captures
fundamental areas that can suffer from
improper data analytics. Those are:

•

•

•

•

The right to be free from the
unwarranted
appropriation
or
exploitation of one's personality,
The publicizing of one's private affairs
with which the public has no legitimate
concern,
The wrongful intrusion into one's
private activities, in such manner as to
outrage or cause mental suffering,
shame, or humiliation to a person of
ordinary sensibilities, or
Being presented in a "false light."

These areas may be mapped to these
technologies and the potential damage they may
cause. The publication of aspects of a person's
private life with which the public has no
legitimate concern or interest may come from
analytics which reveal an intensely personal
item, such as health, pregnancy or financial
frailty, the disclosure of which is harmful and
for which there is no need for someone to know.
It does not matter if this is a truthful inference,
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it's that the disclosure is inappropriate. If made
in violation of law that disclosure may lead to
related statutory grounds for a privacy invasion.
The privacy tort of "false light" represents
another aspect of this, where a mis-inference , or
erroneous inference from data analysis may
incorrectly represent someone wrongly as to
their status, state or conduct and thus injure
them in a variety of ways.
Where data analytics allow one to intrude
into the private activities of someone, we may
have an open question as to what would
constitute a wrongful intrusion into that area;
violation of statutory limitations on data
processing and use that produce this might be
such a tortious action. It is possible that a
common-law violation may evolve with greater
appreciation of the particulars of these new
technologies and how they may infringe on one's
personal sphere.
And even violation of one's right of
"publicity," or the unwarranted appropriation
or exploitation of a person's personality, may be
violated where mis-inferences are used m
connection with disclosures relating to an
individual.
The admonition where Justice Brandeis said
the right of privacy is the right to be let alone
is all the more appropriate. Where data analysis
meddles with the lives of others it does not leave
them properly alone and society in law may
need to correct that.

3. DATA AS A POLITY

CONCERN
That this has become a matter of the proper
governance of the polity is best seen in the
policy white papers issued by the Office of the
President of the United States under Barack
Obama. In two papers, from 2014 and 2016 , the
office of the president set out the issues that
must be addressed to maintain a proper balance
between the government and the government.
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The first white paper outlined how "big
data," lawfully applied, would have significant
benefits for public safety and national security.
Yet it acknowledged that its use in these areas,
manifested in "predictive analytics," must be
regularly subjected to careful policy review as to
the outcomes represented. The implementation
and institutionalization of "best practices"
protocols for data use and storage would be a
foundation of this. The White House suggested
that engagement of federal agencies with
extensive experience in dealing with privacy and
data practices could assist state local and other
authorities in the proper use of these analytic
technologies in accordance with law. This
included the use of commercial data products.
The second white paper drilled down into
fundamental issues of system design as they
related to data analytics for governance. The
key challenges that must be addressed relate to
the data that is processed by the system, the
design of the algorithmic systems (including AI
and machine learning technologies), and the
way in which this data is used. It noted that
these powerful data analytics were used for
credit lending decisions, employment decisions,
education, healthcare, and criminal justice.
The risks began with data. Where the
primary or initial data sets used poorly selected
data, incomplete or incorrect data, data tainted
by selection bias or internal inferential biases
relating to historical practices, improper misinferences may be the result of analysis against
flawed data. The analytics systems themselves
may be subject to inherent problems of
evaluation and transparency. They may be
"black box" technologies that vendors do not
wish revealed or may not themselves fully
understand. The systems themselves may have
errors within the programming that may
produce erroneous outcomes, at least in some
situations. This risk is heightened with the
growth of self-learning systems of "artificial
intelligence" and machine learning algorithms
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that may evolve without human intermediation
to provide awareness of potential biases or
errors. There is a risk the systems will repeat
those biases and errors incorporated into past
decisions reflected in the data.

4. CONCLUSION
How we balance the risks and benefits of
massive data analytic technology will define the
relationship between the government and the
governed in the information polity, just as
Justice Sotomayor said in United States v Jones.
By failing to address these risks we may very
well damage the liberties and democratic
engagement we need to continue to be the
people we are. This is clearly balanced against
the risks of criminal and terroristic actions that
threaten the peace and stability of our Republic.
But we must address them, and fundamental for
this is our willingness to address the impact of
these new technologies on our rights and
liberties, now and for the future. Failing to do
may very well change who we are and who we
want to be.
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